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Abstract
In this study, previous studies of investigating the effect of
unfunded pension liabilities on shares prices are reviewed and
criticized. New models are derived for determining whether the
empirical results of previous studies are reasonable or not. Larger
sample and more recent data than previous studies are used to the
empirical investigations. It is found that empirical results of the
effect of pension liabilities on share prices are very sensitive to the
model specification and the measurement of variables used.
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I. Introduction
The impact of unfunded pension liabilities on share prices is a
concern of both the accounting and finance professions. Research on
the issue carries implications for capital market efficiency, cor-
porate pension policy, and the effect of private pensions in national
savings [4] • The main purpose of this paper is to theoretically and
empirically re-examine previous studies on this topic. In Section II,
the prior work of Oldfield [9], Feldstein and Seligmen (FS) [4], and
Feldstein and Morck [3] will be reviewed. A new model will be pre-
sented in Section III, and updated pension data will be used to do the
related empirical study, in which both ordinary least squares and the
instrument variables method will be employed. Section IV presents and
analyzes the data characteristics and regression results. Specifica-
tion analysis will be used to show that the regression results are
greatly subject to influence by sample selection, variable definition,
and estimation methods used. Finally, in the last section the bene-
fits of the paper are summarized, and possible research directions
indicated.
II. Review and Critique of Previous Studies
Feldstein and Seligmen [4] attribute the effect of unfunded pen-
sion obligations on share prices to five possible sources: (a) the
tax deductibility of pension contributions; (b) the actuarial rate
assumed; (c) the proportion of unfunded obligations which are vested;
(d) the impact of inflation; and (e) the uncertainty of benefits and
asset yields. Four studies which have examined the magnitude of this
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particular share price effect will be reviewed and discussed in this
section.
The first evidence that unfunded pension liabilities influence
share prices are presented by Oldfield [9] using the following model:
kl\ = a + ht—BT ) + a2^—mH. + a3^~M^
i 1 1 i
+ ht-JTl + a5^~BA^ + "i (1)
l i
where, for each firm i
S = the market value of common equity
X(1-t) = normalized cash flow less depreciation
R = payments to holders of liabilities
BA E book value of total assets
PSD = preferred stock dividends paid
ABA = five year growth in book value of total assets
UFVO = unfunded vested person obligation.
This model is similar to the one employed by Modligiani and Miller
in computing cost of capital estimates for the electric utility
industry [7]. It differs in three respects. First, the dependent
variable is the size adjusted equity value instead of a similarly
adjusted estimate of the value of the firms unlevered cash flow.
Second, an instrumental variables approach is not used to estimate
X(1-t); rather, separate estimates for the expected tax adjusted
equity earnings were computed for each firm using an appropriate time
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series model, and cash flows to other parties were included sepa-
rately. Finally, as the sample was not confined to the electric util-
ity industry, risk classes were constructed on the basis of ordinary
and unlevered (Hamada [6]) betas. The coefficient of interest, a,,
was usually less than -1.6, and was in 50 percent of all cases signi-
ficant at the 5 percent level.
In addition to the factors named by Feldstein and Seligman [4]
,
the a, coefficient should also be influenced by the potential claim on
assets held by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. Since 1974,
firms have been liable for unfunded pension obligations for an amount
up to 30 percent of net worth. Gersowitz [5] found that the a,
coefficient was much more negative in Oldfield's model when the sample
was confined to firms with a net worth sufficiently large to make them
liable for their entire unfunded obligation.
Utilizing inflation adjusted data, Feldstein and Seligmen [4]
extended the work of Oldfield with the following models:
#. = ao + aitf!. + °2 (GR0W) i + -A + \ • Betaiii i
+ a
5y. + V"aH. +G i (2)
i i
where for each firm i
V = the total market value of the firm
A i the replacement value of physical assets
E = equity profits plus interest payments
GROW E average 10 year percentage growth in E
RD = research and development expenditures
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Beta = Merrill Lynch beta coefficient
D = estimate market value of debt
UFVL = unfunded vested pension liabilities
and
^\ B + »lSJt + B 2 (GR0W E) i + 63[f\ + 64 * Betai
1 1
where for each firm i
VE = market value of common equity
AE = replacement value of equity assets
EE = common equity earnings plus inflation gains on debt
GROW E = ten year percentage growth of EE.
Several differences exist between these models and the one used by
Oldfield. With regard to equation (2)', three different variables are
used to proxy expected future earnings. The sample is not stratified
on the basis of risk; instead, beta and debt values are used directly
in the model. Equation (2) differs from equation (2)' in that the
dependent variable measures total, not equity, value. Finally, both
models control for size effects using replacement value, as opposed to
the book value, of total assets.
Estimation of the regression coefficients were made for the years
1976 and 1977. In general, th a, and &, terms were usually less than
o o
-1.44 and -1.23, respectively, and significant at the 5 percent level.
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Feldstein and Morck [3] replicated these models using data for 1979 and
1980, and arrived at similar conclusions.
In the aggregate, these studies suggest that unfunded pension
liabilities reduce share price on roughly a dollar-for-dollar basis.
Some issues concerning methodology must, however, be resolved. Such
will be the focus of the next section.
III. A Revised Model
Our chief item of interest is the effect of the risk variables on
the estimation of the a, and 3- coefficients. We are motivated by the
6 6
prior work of (1) Hamada [6], who showed that the beta coefficient is
influenced by leverage; (2) Stone [11], who extended Hamada' s work to
include unfunded vested pension obligations; and Arnott and Gersowitz
[1], who justified the inverse relationship seen between unfunced
obligations and conventional debt. To derive our new model, we extend
MM [7] valuation model to include a preferred stock (PSTK) and an
unfunded vested pension obligation (UFVO) as follows:
Market Value of a Firm = Market Value of [Equity + Debt + PSTK + UVFOj
MV(V) = MV(E) + MV(D) + MV(PSTK) + MV(UVFO) (3)
The pretax cash flow minus deprecation of the firm is assumed to be X.
The after-tax cash flow which can be distributed to the securities
holders and the employees is
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Y = X - t(X - R - BEN)
= (1-t)X + tR + x(BEN) (4)
where
R = interest payments,
BEN = pension benefits.
Further assume the X, the R and the BEN to be perpetual. The
discounted rate for (1-t)X must be p , the cost of equity without debt
and pension liability. The discount rate of both R and BEN would be
r
,
cost of debt, since both streams are riskless (MM assumption).
Combining equations (3) and (4), we arrive at
MV(v) = (1
~ T >X +HL + T . BEN
u d d
p r r
oidhl25.+ t .mv(D) + T'MV(UFVO) (5)
or,
u
P
MV(E) (1 T)X - (I-t)MV(D) - (l-x)MV(UFVO) - MV(PSTK)
P
=
(1~ T)X
-
(1
"] )R
- (l-x)MV(UFVO) 2. ( 6 )
u d p
P r p
r
where
DIV = dividend payout for preferred stock,
p the cost of preferred stock.
Now, if the growth potential and risk are considered, equation (6)
will be modified as
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MV(e) = (1
" T)X
-
(1
"^
)R
- (I-t)-MV(UFVO) E.
u d p
+ k ABV + k RD + k [BETAU] • BV (7)
where
ABV = five-year average growth of the firm's book assets,
BETAU = unlevered beta coefficient.
The ABV measures the historical growth of a firm, while R&D expense
measures the future growth potential of a firm. The unlevered instead
of levered beta is used to measure risk, since the leverage effect is
already captured by (l-x)R/r . Expressing equation (7) as a
regression formular, we obtain
MV(E) = aA + a.(l-T)X + a (l-x)R + a.UFVO + a.DIV1 2 3 4 p
+ a c ABV + a^RD + a_(BETAU)«BV + e (8)5 6 7
To reduce heteroscedasticity problem, dividing both sides of (8) by
BV, we have
MV(E) ' 1 (1-t)X (1-t)R UFVO
BV "
a a
BV
a
l BV
3
2 BV
a
3 BV
DIV
+ a
4 "BV
2
"
+ 3
5 *% + %W + V BETAU) + £ (9)
If the model can evaluate the equity correctly, then
a
Q
= 0; aQ
= 0; a
±
= l/pu
; ^ = -l/r
d
; a^ = -(1-t);
a
4
=
-l/p P ; a
5
> 0; a
fi
> 0; a
?
< 0. (10)
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Since Benz [2] and Reinganum [10] found the "size effect" in testing
the CAPM, we would expect a
n
> if there exists a "size effect" in the
valuation model.
Oldfield did not include the size effect as found by Benz and
Reinganum or the future potential growth as discussed by Myers [8]# In
FS models of (2) and (2)', the components E in (2) and EE in (2)' did
not include preferred dividend or UFVO. As a result, the coefficients
a.. (3,) and a? (8-) will not be explained as the costs of pure equity
and debt, respectively. On the other hand, our model (9) can be used
to estimate the costs of the pure equity, preferred stock and debt,
the size effect and the impacts of risk, historical growth, future
potential growth and UFVO on the market value of the equity.
The data for this study comes from three sources. Unfunded vested
pension liabilities are calculated using the FASB 36 Data Base compiled
at Columbia University. Necessary balance sheet and income statement
data come from the Compustat tapes; market betas are calculated using
CRSP data. The number of firms with complete data for 1979, 1980, and
1981 are 280, 596, and 479, respectively.
An Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and a two-stage regression are used
to estimate the coefficients in equations (1), (2), (9) and a revised
(1). The unlevered beta is added into equation (1) to measure the
risk. The book value of total assets, instead of replacement cost of
equity value, is used in FS model (2). In addition, the growth in
equity (GROWE) is replaced by the growth in the book value of total
assets. The two-stage regression (instrumental variable regression)
is used to explore the effect of measurement error in earnings term.
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IV. Analysis of Results
Table I shows the means and standard deviations for the basic vari-
ables in 1979, 1980 and 1981. Note that all variables approximately
stay the same values in all three years. The annual growth rates are
about 9 percent in all three years. Debt ratios (D/BV) are about 24
percent, while pre-tax earnings minus depreciation (ERN/BV) are about
7.5 to 8.0 percent. The unfunded vested obligations (UFVO/BV) are 0.7
percent, -0.2 percent and -0.1 percent in 1979, 1980 and 1981, respec-
tively. The UFVO/BV are less than the values in FS studies. The nega-
tive value of UFVO means overfunded. The pension liabilities in our
sample, on average, are almost balanced.
Table II presents the correlation matrix of basic variables. The
simple correlations between market value of equity (VE/BV) and unfunded
vested obligation (UFVO/BV) are -0.130, -0.118 and -0.111 in 1979, 1980
and 1981, respectively, indicating that these two variables are weakly
inversely correlated, as we expected. The earnings, debts and preferred
stocks are highly correlated with market value of the equity with right
signs. However, the unlevered betas (BETAU) are highly correlated with
VE/BV but with wrong signs in all three years, and leverred betas
(BETA) are only slightly correlated again with wrong signs. According
to CAPM, the higher the risk (beta), the higher the required rate of
return, and the lower the market value of the firm.
Because earnings in the valuation models are defined as market's
expectation of the long-run, future earnings power of the firm, an
instrumental variables regression is used to estimate the unobservable
earnings. The first-stage regression of earnings on the instrumental
-10-
variables is represented in Table III. All coefficients of the instru-
mental variables are significant at the 5 percent level in all years
and both dependent variables except the coefficients of the size in
1980 and 1981 as the dependent variable being equity earnings (EE/BV).
_2
The adjusted R is about 50 percent.
Table IV represents estimates of four alternative specifications and
two different regression methods of the equity market value equation.
All coefficients on unfunded vested pension obligation are negative and
between -1.0 and 0.0 except OLS estimates of FS model with a positive
value in 1980. They are all significant in 1979 except FS model. How-
ever, they are all insiginif icant in 1980 and 1981. Furthermore, all
coefficients are also significantly different from 0.54 (1-t), the
theoretical value, at the 5 percent level. Most of the coefficients on
(UFVO/BV) in 1979 are higher than the theoretical value, while all of
the coefficients in 1980 and 1981 are less than the theoretical value.
As a result, with our larger sample, the four different alternative
models do not show much different among them for the impacts of pension
liability on the market value of corporate equity. Furthermore, the
coefficients on UFVO/BV in our sample are much lower than Oldfield's
and FS's (their coefficients are greater than one). For our sample,
the test power for four different models is not good enough to distin-
guish zero and the theoretical value -0.54. But, most of the results
do reject the coefficient of -1.0. The evidence for a larger sample
than previous studies is consistent with the conclusion that share
prices reflect only some value of unfunded vested pension obligations.
The evidence can be explained as (i) the pension liability is overesti-
mated, and (ii) the investors undervalue this sort of future liability.
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The historical growth and future potential growth have positively
significant impact on the share price. Comparing OLS estimates with
two-stage estimates, most of the results show that most of the OLS
estimates are more reasonable than the two-stage regression. There
exists a slight but insignificant "size effect" in the OLS estimates.
This evidence confirms Banz [2] and Reinganum [10] studies.
The coefficients on earnings, interest payments and preferred
stock dividends in Oldfield and our models can be explained as the
costs of pure equity, debt and preferred stock, respectively.
However, the coefficients on earnings and debt in FS model cannot be
explained as the costs of pure equity and debt, respectively. The
costs of capitals estimated from OLS method are first demonstrated as
follows.
Even though the signs on the costs of pure equity, debt and pre-
ferred stock are correct in all three years and in both Oldfield and
our models, the estimated cost of preferred stock are unreasonable.
The costs of pure equity are about 14 percent, 23 percent and 16 per-
cent in 1979, 1980 and 1981, respectively. The costs of debt are
about 11 percent, 13 percent and 12 percent in 1979, 1980 and 1981,
respectively. These estimated costs of capital seem reasonable except
the cost of pure equity in 1979.
However, the cost of pure equity in two-stage regression is about
14 percent in 1979. It seems more reasonable than the OLS estimate.
Furthermore, all of the coefficient signs in our model are correct in
all three years except the coefficient on beta.
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V. Conclusion
We have used larger sample and more recent data than previous stu-
dies to re-examine the impact of unfunded pension obligations on the
share price. Four alternative models are used. The evidence shows the
share prices reflect but not fully the value of the unfunded pension
obligations. However, the test power is too low to distinguish between
zero and the theoretical value, -0.54. The instrumental variables
approach is also employed to adjust the reported earnings. However,
this approach failed to outperform the direct OLS method. The valua-
tion models of Oldfield's and ours are also used to estimate the costs
of capital. Except the cost of preferred stock, the estimated costs of
debt and pure equity seem reasonable. Our models also showed a weak
"size effect."
In sum, we proposed a revised evaluation model to re-examine the
impact of unfunded pension obligation on share prices with recent data.
The results cannot reject our null hypothesis that one-dollar unfunded
pension liability reduces 54 £ share price, even though the estimated
values are less than 54£.
-13-
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Table I
Means and Standard Deviation of Basic Variables
1979 1980 1981
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Book Value (1/BV) 0.0019 0.0018 0.0017 0.0017 0.0015 0.0016
Growth (ABV/BV) 0.0934 0.0347 0.0900 0.0406 0.0931 0.0379
Debt (D/BV) 0.2440 0.1273 0.2363 0.1307 0.2425 0.1326
Preferred (PSTK/BV) 0.0246 0.0400 0.0242 0.0400 0.0273 0.0401
Common Dividend (DIV/BV) 0.0217 0.0133 0.0222 0.0140 0.0235 0.0148
Earnings-FN (EE/BV) 0.0611 0.0393 0.0575 0.0415 0.0537 0.0393
Earnings (ERN/BV) 0.0801 0.0367 0.0780 0.0357 0.0756 0.0342
Interest (R/BV) 0.0140 0.0067 0.0157 0.0079 0.0175 0.0090
Preferred Dividend (PSD/BV) 0.0021 0.0032 0.0020 0.0032 0.0024 0.0035
R&D Expense (RD/BV) 0.0099 0.0186 0.0115 0.0207 0.0120 0.0225
UFVO 0.0070 0.0436 -.0021 0.0418 -0.0111 0.0411
Levered Beta (BETA) 1.1869 0.4493 1.0798 0.4668 0.9875 0.4642
Unlevered Beta (BETAU) 0.8370 0.4144 0.8006 0.4356 0.7055 0.4158
Market Value (E/BV) 0.4691 0.3411 0.5601 0.5061 0.4605 0.3872
Sample Size (N) 280 596 479
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Table III
First-Stage Regression of Earnings on the Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable: ERN/BV
Size GROWA
Year Constant 1/BV ABV/BV FT
1979 0.056* 3.034* 0.223* -.093* -.148* 1.078* 0.498
(8.026) (3.341) (4.826) (-5.886) (-3.032) (8.375)
1980 0.054* 1.882* 0.223* -.082* -.129* 1.0543* 0.496
(12.573) (2.832) (8.282) (-8.355) (-4.172) (12.964) —
1981 0.044* 2.244* 0.197* -.055* -.102* 1.113* 0.446
(9.152) (2.871) (6.199) (-5.006) (-2.900) (13.136)
Dependent Variable: EE/BV
1979 0.037* 2.669* 0.257* -0.106* -.176* 1.161* 0.538
(5.155) (2.862) (5.415) (-6.586) (-3.499) (8.789)
1980 0.031* 1.025 0.289* -.111* -.139* 1.259* 0.576
(6.854) (1.448) (10.095) (10.612) (-4.240) (14.532)
1981 0.020* 1.096 0.224* -0.073* -0.151* 1.400* 0.538
(4.029) (1.333) (6.693) (-6.339) (-4.091) (15.719)
*: significant at the 5% level
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